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chapter Seven

The Prosecutor's Contribution to
Wrongful Convictions
Bennett 1. Gershman, Pace University

Introduction
I\. prosecutor is viewed by the public as <1 powerful law enforcement offici al who:;e responsibility is to convict guilty people of crimes. But nut evcT}!body understands tJJat 3
prosecutor" function is Jlot only to win convictio ns of law- hrea ker~ . A prosecutor is a
quasi-judicial official who has a duty to promote justice 10 the entire cummllility, including
those people ch~Lrged with crimes. lndeed, a ll overriding function of;) prosec lltor is to
ensure that innocent people do nol get onvicted and punished. The Supreme Court
observed in the famous passage in RerxC"r v. United Slales (1935) that a I!fLlse !.Itpr' dll e1 ]
responsibility is that "guilt shall not escape or innocen e suffi r" (p. 8).
Despite t]w heavy burd('n placed on prosecutors to ensure tbat justice is allurdcd to
nil accllsed, empirical and anecdotal evidence strongly demonstrates thal prosec utur·by overt misco nduct, exercise of bad judgment, or ~irnrlc carelc:$,~l1e ~ - have been
responsible for G1L1sing the convicLiom o{hundreds, perh'lps thollsands, of illD ocen t
persons. The media regulady reporl stori ~ of innocent iJl:nph.: being rcIea'ed afte r ·rending
many ye;Hs in prison ti.n;] crillle tlll:Y did Ilot commit. I[n Illany Ill' th(:se in ~ l ,lnc(:S, th en·
is powerful eviJence tll;] llhe wrongrul (lnvictil>i1 \\',15 attriuutable dire ·,Iy, or iod irellly,
lo errors or miscollduct by prosecutors. According to the N,llioll.ll Registry of Ex()rwral i.(lll~
(,IS of September, :~ o 13), I , J62 d efe nJant ~ ill Ih.: u..'). h~vc beell exo nerated sine(' 19WJ,
<Iu d: rrQ~ e lIto rial OlisCOJ1uU t ba~ been;) signiJlcant factor ill Illore ihan one-third of
Lhese erron eu us cUllvictions.
Il shuuld he intuitively obvioL'ls that given the preeminent role played ny' th e pro ~(Ultor
in the U.S. criminal justice system, the he<lvi ':it responsihility for ' nsuring thal only guilty
pt' nplc: :l[e convicted lies wiLh th e prose utor. rvll)l·e 'tnan allY l>ther gowrtlJl1CnL official, a
prosecutor i->0~s esst:S tlJe gr('alest power to lilke away a pl'rsull\ liberty, reputation, ;1l1d eV~11
a per 'on" life. The irresponsi bk use of this puwer, n noted above, (an nave Lrrwi rc~uJts.
A prosec u tor is con stilutiona lly ~nd cthic.dly mandated In p roll1otl· jl1 tice. The
prosecutor is even co nsiderccl a " Millst(;r of justic:c" who 11:1'; a cOl1 stitution al, slatulor ,
and cthi I d lil y til c n~ urc tll,lt a dercndallt is convi Ie I Oil till: ha sis of rci i;l ht.: viJcl1l:c
in prol~ eeJin t',.~ th,lt are biro Ncvc:ri.hde · , oml' pro:c lllC)r~ dev iale from the. e ruk~ ;Ind
eng, ge in conLilId th,l l di~t()r\..'; the l~c' - findiil g process 'Imll'l(ldlICc.'!:> crn Il WO U $ L.Oi1vj( liOi1" .
Indeed, if ;1 prmecutor is motivated to i'.ca l(1ll sly win a COllvictiol1 by \l ny Jl1e;l il,,) dll d
ell rage. in wndud lb ,lt ~· ith \! r intentionall}, 01' clreiessly undcrillin '~ lh ~· lIllt:g ril y of the
[" cl- nlldin g I'rocess , lhe prme ' Lllor i, eSG1pahly will hring abulil the convi - l ion o[ ,\
dcl«llcl ,ll1t I\lho is actu::tlly in n) ' en I.
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Stepping Back: A Brief Historical Perspective
ProS(Tuiors historicall}' have e.'ercised eno rl11 ous power wit h v ry lilll oversight or ;j
(nuntJbiJit), over the use of that ,Jo\\'<:r. Th e ahsell .C o ( signi fiCl llt checks h,15 r('a t d b ro;ld
opportunities .l~'r abuse. .onllllcntalo)"s havc rn ulinly bemoalled lil , rr qUCllCY, Ild n, grail y
of misconducl by I'fOSCClllOJ--;. Dean RO$ () Pound ( 1930) morc th, 11 t:.ight)' ),t:a r < go dccried
th "numher o f new trials for gravc miscond ucl o f the pllbl i prose L tnr" an d the U;jbusc and
disrega rd of forensic propriety whi( h threatens to become Ihe ~ ta pl " in American prosecul ions"
(p. 187). The Icgal Jjterature over lhc years has ontained titi e~ such a, "Improper ,untlu I
of Prosecuting Attorlleys,""Rel11d,ks of l'rosecut in g At WrI1C)f as PrC'j lltii ci, I Error," "Appea ls
to Ra e Prejudice by Counsel in Criminal Cases," and ", haLl Pros ·culor Concc<11 FacL ."
The most ramous cillcul11cntati()11 of misclllldlld hy l'rLl~(y ul() rs W;l~ ,'(llllaincd in the
1\):~ 1 Report by the National COlllmission on Law Ob 'crVJn e , n I Enforce menl, popularly
known as the Wickersham CO lllllli sion, which s)'~rcl1l a tiG1L1 y docu mcnted wi des prea d
abuses by U.S. prosecutors aud tilC ;ldversc impact 0 Ih e misco ndu ct on the administrat ion
of crimjnaJ justice. Examlles o r lhe m iscOllduct col11miltcd by prosecuto r ', ;lIld the c 11 sequences to the f~lir administraL i n of ju. tic , are descr ibed in th e ~e -tions below. Pc rhap
the most serious ClJllsequel1cc of rhe mi "condu ct, a cu rdi ng LO the l'j'on, i. "the com'ic i 11
of the innocent."
Indeed, the: qucstion ar the time ur 1J1 C Rq)()rl, ;H1d thcrcan l' r as 1.0 wh t' thl'r inl1oc,'lil t
persons were convicted of crimes W,lS neil'her abstrilct nor hYPOlhe tical. The welJ-knuwn
study by Professor Edwin M. Borchard (19,2 ), C Onl J ict7J1g the IIIJlOCe llt , docul11ellted sixtyfive cases of convictio ns of innocen t der~n dants drawn (rom a nlllcb larger number of
erroneo us crim inal convictions of inr1oc'nt people. The most prominent callsC" of
erron e llS convicti ons, Borchard found, and this is similar to the tindin gs tuciay, were
mistaken identificatiuns and witn ess perjury.
Moreover, there i. Ilillie doubt that the Supreme Court's lo:llTIow, <I rli cul,ltion of the
prosecutor's special obli,gation [0 ~1l5L1rC Ihat "justlc!' shaH bt' done" ill lhe JY 35 B..;}ger
decision was inL1uenccd by then-Cano n 5 of the Ca nons of Profess ional Elh ics o( the
American Bar AssQcjation (1 908), which stated: "The primary d uty of a lawyer engaged
ill publ'i c proseculion is nol to convict, uut to see that jlJS Licc is dOlle. The su ppression
of facts or the secreting of wi tll esse.~ capable 0 f est,l bl ish irig the innnccnce of the accused
is highly reprehensibl e." NevertJ1clcss, despi r lega l and ethica l nonns dl!.~i g ncd to en ~Cl uri1 g('
prosecuto rs to purslle justice rather thall CO ll\rictio n , cmpi.ri 'al stuJi es 'ince 1935 have
documented serious and pervasive mi~colldu c l by prm;c ul or:-. And whi le ourLS have
contill l1.cci to bemoan their inability [0 make p ro eelltofs play by lhe ruk", 't here i. Jittle
evidence that courts, lawm akers, or pro ressi()n~d d isci plinary hodies have d 'rnon~lrat cd
a vvillingness or cap<lcity LO impose sanctions 0 11 prosecllt oh for CO l11l11illing misconduCt.

Significance of a Prosecutor's Mental Culpability
l ir~ llt

III :lllal )l7. in g th ' nnture, ' [e nt, and re,I $Cl Il fo r ~I proscclI tor\ wr Ilgflll o r [lcg , ": til
(olldul:l, it i often unclea r Wlll:th r a ~H'OS .::1 lt o r i:, l1l o ti va ted bv a gaud f.litil d esl r~ I
.
\\'1 11 '
'o nvict a perso ll th e prosec ut o r h JI1esl'ly h e li e ve.~ is glJiit " M:l ba d 1:1ith des ire \0 ' 0 1.'
cCllviclio ll a l all CO/its rcgard lcs;; or wh eth er th '.' d '( 'wlant io a.; tuall ! guilt y. lJ)'( ) c~.ltt(LiI.
often argue that cvell if Ilw y may ha ve devi aled from a ru le , Lhe violation was no t \"111 \/ till
but attributable to mi stake, in advcrten ce. or Lh e pI" ~ lIre
th e trial. 'o urts II 'liel ,

or
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whether ;1 proseclIto r's violali n Ill' !I rule was ddiiJcr,ll ' ur inadvertent; nor

JlOI': ~Llrts typicall}' ask whether a pru ccutur was mo tiva ted to bri ng ahout the conviction
d~ a per. un wh o m lhc pr()~c utn r belicved !TIn have hl:Cll inllOCl.' nt. Thes e questions
I

~'IJJlQSl aJwa '. n.r ' in at:able l)~ reo (JIUl ion, Fi rsl, I ryill g to ,divine it prnsecutllr';~ ~IJtenl 1)1"
olival ion IS vlrlually' I!TI11osslble, Morcl )vcr, sed Illg I .. !.ilsco vcr a prU 5ccutor S III kilt to
11119a9 in 11lISCOIli..JlIct,
'
.1
I 'JIl d 'f.'
. lad
- .IlTe 1~~ val1l. 1\5 one court
orlcr
I I Tenet' to th
e trlltiI,'IS III
c
Cl
it,
"ll
hurl:>
the
dl:fendant
jmt
.IS mu cil In have pre.jud.icial blasts come (rom the
llt
;rurrlpet of the angc.l C.lbriL'J" ([j llilcd S/II/n 1'. Nettl. J 941, p, lJ30),
It is also no teworth}, Ih ~11 <l prosecutor's conduct in causing ;'l n innocent person to be
convicted does not require <l Gnding th;]l lilt;; proscl:utUl: engaged in any Illjs..:onduct.
:-;olll(' vini<ltions, as noted below, haw a consic]nable bearing on whether an innocent
:lefenJant may be o und guilt>,. Tl be sure, conduct that distorts Ihe fact-findjng I ro(.c~s
and lIlilnipularcs the L ct-finder':; ev,1l1l3lion uf tbt' proof freql1cntly play' a sign.ificClnt
role in Ii'll' convicl ian of lUI inn!. (l'lll person. But even ,dlscnt allY Wl'\)l1gflil cunduct, a
prO!(eClI tor's condu..:;L nl<lY Will ribn te to an ' rroneou s COil jel ion merely by the prosecutor's
failure \.0 scrutinize cardllUy the l.juality of his prouf and to examine closely the reliability
(lnd credibility of his wilnc's es. Thus. even absent wro ngful conduct, a prosecutur lD<ly
be exercising poor judgment in allowing a tenuous case to go forward to trial. Lndeed, if
,I prosecutor after closely examining his proof is not morally cC'rtJin of a dcfend<Ult's gwlt,
Ihen the prosecutor hilS abdic.ltec'l his resrunsibility to protect innocent persons from
being wrongfully co nvicted Jnd punished.
Wilh respect to .1 pm<;eclItor'::. rnilldst:'t in prl'paring to go to t.rial, every proSt'culur
probably believes (hat thl' Jcfl'nc1alll i~ guilty and probably has as~ell1hl~d wbat he
bd icV('s 10 be s urfil~ie)11 l'vidence to prove the defendant's guilt. Howcwr, it. is not
unusual thelt given (1n illll~ ll~ive investigation ot a C:lse, there Illay be evidence i.n the
proseculiOIl or police ~iJc s thaI contradic t the defendant's guilt, or at least ra ises a
signific;lIlt dl,ubt. nnw should a prosecutor view Ihis colltradictory proof? Studies show
Ihat a prosecuto r predis poscd ttl believe. in the deft::ndant's guilt and sCl:ki.ng to win a
cOllv i -lillll may [it,d, view I.Dntr.ldidl.lry evidence as fal<;e. irrdevant, Or llnrcl,iable,
and certainly not sufficient to C(1l1Sl' tUt' I'rO,\el:utor to rethink the tlll:nry or prosecution
or cause the prosecutor to h.:siwtc tu t~lk the case to tri,t!. Expert.s in cognitive psycilology
maintain that prosecutors ordinarily make profess ioll'll decisions ba 'cd on Lheir personal
beliefs, values, and incentives, :lUd these psych llogical forces may kad .I prosecutor to
make dec isions, even unilltcnliull,ally, that ,In' inconsist.:nt with fJ[omotin g justice
(Findley & Scott, 2006). Thes ,:, luLii's q Ll!:stion whether prosecutors arc able 10 maintain
th e neutrality and objectivitr thelt i~ ncl'Cied to Ijf'1t<:Cl inllo<.:ent [l~rS(lnS agaill st a
wrol1gful prosecution, and su gesl' Ihal Lhese psychological bi es impede ratioDa'!
dec ision -making.
A pros ecutor seeking to win a COllviLlic I) is likel y 10 l)vL'restinwte the strength o f her
case and underestimate th e probative valu E' l lf evidence that contradicts or undermines
her case. For example, studi e~ show that too Ill. n}' p ro~ec lJt()rs exhibit a so-called "tunnel
vision" whereby they ignore 01' di, miss evidence that IHight cl,Jlltradict rhe tldendan t'
guilt (Ba nd es, 2006 ); <1 "c lIlii rllJ.lli o n hias" lhal r ·Jits c'vide ll ce that co nfirms th '
prosecution's th eory and di scounl;; 'vidl: ncl' thaI cOllt radicts tll.1t Lhe ry ([3urkt'. :W(6 ) ;
"seJective info rm atiol1 proc5sillg" tita l \wi::- hs cvi<il'1I e Ihal suppurt. Olle':; belief mo n.:
heavily th an evidence thal ontradiCl~ IIl!)se belier; "belief pcrseverance" Ihal de crib e~ n
I'endency to adhere to one's c h o ~c n theory evcn thllugh Ile w evidence cnme' t light lh ,1[
completely undercuts that tJleory\ evidcnti (l ry b. sis; . Ild "a voida nce ognitive Li: 'onHllce"
under which a person tel1(h 10 .I Iju t her beli ,rs 10 -onlorm to her behavior.
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Impairing the Integrity of the Fact-Finding Process
T he proseaHor d l!llin:lIc$ 111(" (.'1 I-findin .... prC)ce ' ill several \WI}'I1. Fir: I, the prose ut or
hal>. vinuall1lonopoly
the pron r. superior;t ceo S 10 a nd kn o\.y l cdg~ of the facls rh,ll
nrc.: I1 sed [0 O ll,,;c t 'j l ~ e ndanl , and rhe :1bi lity 10 shape Jnd pr en t III c rad s tn the
f<lc i-li ndcr in lhe 1110s1 persua!iive way. To be sure, as a legal and ()lhical mailer a prosecu tor
must h.. vc con fi dence in the reliabili L' f his cvidc.nce 0(:1"01'(: bringing cil:1rgc$, a nd hefore
prescJ) ling the evid ence 10 a jur y. TlQ\vever, as noted ab 'Ie , a pm secu t r typically j
con fi den t in the accuracy o f his evidence, whether or not that confi den i juslified.
Mo reover, as the reprc e nialivc of the government, the' pro. e utor before the ju ry i
loaked wit h considera ble pr~ tigc and re peel, and therefo re has a unique p wer to alIt: t
a jury' evaluatiOIl or the ract~. Juries ma~' view lhe proseclilOr as a "Champioll oj" rusti e,"
a heroic fIgure I· 110 ca n bl: t rust.ed to ll. c the fact a nd make argu men t. in fair a nd rcspo n illl" man ne r.
Th· types of neluel' by prosecuto rs tha t con tribute to wrongful co nvi rion usuall ),
fi t inlO several wcll-rL:cognized categories. The), in c/ude conceaJing evi dence that may
prove a d efenda nt's innocence, presenting evidence of all id ntifiCiltioll wiulcss thaI i
unreliable, eli citing testimo llY from a.n accomplice, i.nfo rmant, or jailhouse "sn itch" tJ1al
i f'3lse, oO'ering testimony by a po li e \ itne.s that is false an d in acc ura le. prcsell tillg
test imony in child sc.xu;il ahuse as lha \. is unt rut h (ul or exagg ra ted, and pre.s<.'nt.ing
sciC'nliJi evidence tha r is fraudul en t or erroneou .
T he foil win g cclions desc ribe ~xalfl pl c.s f mi_co nc1uct by prosecutor lil. t eli tOri
the fa ct-fll1(ung procc~s an d interfere with l.he jury's ability to dt:cide a cnse fa irly anu
{:l tiflll ;.llly.
Pl'(l~€'culor~' suppres'S'io n of f;JvornMe cI'idence, A p rosecutor's failure to disdo I:
favorabl evidence to U1C de fen se that may either ~\"Clll pate a defendant or u ndcrmiJH~
the tru lbfld ncs or reliabili ty ( pro ' ccllLion I\'i.fne se is one o f th ~ leading cau es of
wroflgfu I convictions ( ;!r relt, ~ O I I ). Under the' landmark case of Brady v. Maryland
(1963), a prosecllt r's failu re to disclose favoI;ab le evidt'nce that is ITHl lcri, I to y-u il l or
PU ll ; hrneIH, rega rdless f the reason, and reg.lrdlcss of the prosecutor's good or bad
fai th , viola les due process. The kiJlds of proo f that are principa l b ...;es for wrongful convic tio ns - er ron eous yewilness idc.lltificati(Il%, cooperation d eals wi lh witn cs e So and
fl awed sci entific evi de nce - ofte n havc been s uppressed by p rosec utors a nd only mall)'
years later have been d iscovered. Fo r c xa ll1p le, after <1 11 exoneratio n based o n D A
("vidence, j( may be revealed that the identily of (he reaJ perpetrator was known 10 the
police fro m the beginning bUl ne ver di . c1o st:d LO the defendant. T he U.S. Su pr '~c
COllrt ha:, ruled in sever;11 c(lses th a t prosecutors were guillY of u ppn.:ssi ng rn~It:1l31
e vi den ce , , nJ if is reaso nall y d ear in ome of the' , ca es th at the defe nd a nt I" ;\~
wl'Ongfullr conv icted.
. d
II is difficu lt to esLimate the nllmber of defendants who have been wro ngfully conv1c;le
cause o f <l prose ulor's suppression of xculpatory evidence. It appears thal apa rt fro m
err r. Id. Ling lo in OmpdCn[ defense: co unsel, the most frequ cnt basis for wrongful co~~
\fictjons ha been pr J cculorial suppression of ;(culpal ryevidence. Acco rding to OIl'!
~tud)'. ut of 133 know n exoncr<llions th at resulted !.I I a wrillcn dl i ion bJ' a co~LI'I, ,(1 ,
dcfendanl~, ()r jusl vcr 10(11\" . ulted in relic ba tl li n a vi'Jlation of Hmriy (L"lrr"'cr
200R).A study of all exo ne ra lion in Mas~achu elL> ~h()ws tha J 2 o f 33 case., or ( .1
36%, involved a Brad)' vi ola ti on (Fisher. 2002) .
:IIi!
1l11
' nHsl
. ak
'
uses .II1VO I'lIng
' en eyewl.lness 'd'r;
t e.n1J 1 < lion
iJrl: p er IHIP~ r I1e f1l 0~- I .cln If• ;111

or

example of the im p.lci f it p rosecutor's viola tion o f Hmrly o n the con"j .l! ()~l ( lll,l!
c
innocen t pe.rs n. Suppn::ssed evidence hy lhe pro ..cclIlor sh owing thal tJl!~ WJlil "
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I,' been Illisl;lk ~1 ran lTes (rom ev~d enc~ tl~a~ ~be ~)~Ii c illit!all y suspecled a,nother person
I'Iill ' littcd Ihe erl111e, Iu ;111 eycwltncss s 1J)lllall'aiJurc to Idenllfy the defendant, Lo an
L<1I11111 I :ss's JJosili ve i lentilication of 'omeolle else 'I~ the perpetrator. MO'I recelltl y. in
'\\" I .. ' "
c.Y~ . " I', Cll ill (_ 01 1 ). Ihe. uprem~ Curt rever 't:d a 1l1111der com'i '[ion b -c aU $ C Lhe
I tll'
I 011 Iyeycwlln
' c$ ,Illlti
. .a II y
"",jlJIt: LItoI' s l1~p rc ssc ( j a po I'Ice 0 t' fi'ICeI' ' IIOlc ' r vca I'IIlg 11,lt
\11 ('jS [he police that he ould not identify :tlly the pcrpelralnr , lid nul sec their fa cs.
1
to J[ "wQuld not Imow t h
I saw tern
'h ".
em' f
I ,le
,111 suppression of c;xculpalTlI'Y scic!ltific evidencc ha~ r<.:sluted in the conviction of innocent
ersO ns , For c 'ample, in the widely reported '](:xas case of l'vlich, e.I Morton, an infloceD t
~an vlho was wrongfully convicted or murderi.ng his wife in 1987 and who spent 26
,(' aI'S in prison, the prosecution ~ upprcssed evidellce of a bloody halldana discovered
i,chind h i:; home on I'he clay of the murder which contained DNA t.hal would have
ex.cluded J\l!0rtoo <1ll(1 ideot itied the real killer. tn COllnick v, TI't/III/'SOIl (1011), ,I \..'Tongl'lll
conviction ()f murder in which the defendant spent 18 yein ' in prison, the pro. (' ulion
failed to disclose to the defcnse that a scienti..6c analysis of;] piece of the vic ri m', dorhing
stained with U1C perpetrator's blood showed that il did not mJlch the blood type of Lhe
J.:Jenda n t.
Suppression of evidence that could be used to impeach prosecution wilnesses is commonplace. Prosecutors are nOlorious for failing to di sclose immunity deals with key
witnesses that would suggest to a facl-Gnder that the w,itness W;l$ giving {,list: or misleading
tcslimollY as a quid pro qUI) (Garrett, 2011). Proseculors have f~lile.d 10 reveal th.;]t a
witness':; in<'riminating testimony came about only after [IIi: \Vitncs,~ \V'IS hypnotized,
Prosecutors also have failed to disclose recorded s tatem~IILS of key witJlCS S~ indicating
that they planned to frame the defendan t.
Proserutors' lise of unrdiablc testimony. Some witnesses are indispensable lo secure
convictions of guilty persons, slIdl as eyt:witnt's.o,cs, children, cooperating witn 's e ,
and scientific experts. By the same l'Clkcn, however, these witnesses .Irl~ nOLorious lor
skewing th e fact -finding process and causing erroneOLIs con viLtiolls, nol nec '~.')ar ,ily
because of a pro secutor's mi:;conducl', but because a proscl:uLor has not carefully velled
the witness's story, Too often polic , aJld pl'o~ecl1t[)rs intl'l'view lhese witn e:! ses wilh in ·
sufficient attention to details, contradictions, and inconsisknc:ies. i'vlon.:ov r, Lh ese
witnesses may be unusu ally vulnenblc to coercive or suggestive intervi ewing technique',
It is often unclear wheth er these wil'oes5l'$ have .1l.tuaUy been "coa r heJ" t I r. ivc a Faist..'
or exaggerated account of tbe event, or through sllbtle. intcrviewillg l, >'chniqucs have
shaped their stories to accord with wl,al they hdil'W Ihl' police and pro 'C 'utOL. wallt
to hear.
Identification witnesses. Identification witnesses are among the most lJllldinhle wiLn c.s.
Misidentification is the sing.le largest sow (' of e[for ill wrongful couviclion ;1ses (Garrett,
20 Il). Many prosecutors do nol appreciate the dangers nswciakd with eyewitnesscs, and
the difficulties as.sociated wirh reLrieving a witness's memory of Lin evenl and reconstructing
that memory. Prosecutors in intl'rvicwing such witnesse and prql,lring 111('1l) lor IC~lil)'il'1g
may assist the witness in rCIllemlJt'ring lite event LHIU retrieving a truthful re-collcction.
But a prosecutor's actions illso rn,, )" Ji Sluri a witl1 t ::;'. IInderlyin g m Il'IlJr}, anJ pr(lduc~'
a false recoll ection, A pro ' clltor in pre pa ri.l1g .111 cycwi lIIC: -':. lestimony hol~ lhe ability
to influence a witness to rcmelrrber file ' and fill in gaps thai I1Hly be inaccurate. bUI which
the witness may come to belicvc art' the tfllth. lVioreover, h 'GlU'ie of th e proseLlIlor'
special statllS, he is often viewed by th e witness as an exp l:rl who is highly kll1.1WleJgcilbic
of the facts, and will use the facts respon si bly. ln deed, some witnesses ma}' l'ven lr )' t
shape their stories to wh at they beli eve may accord with the prosecutor's expectat ions,

or
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Sonll' pnhl'llllors nl~ly evcll allcillpt to ;1dill~1 Iii,' lL'~timony of eyewitnesses to strengthen
illl' ill1fl,I11 1)1 Iheir icklllifl,:ati'lll, ,1Illl an CITOIWOU-; conviction. For example, in Kyles v.
Whit"';' IIY'}'i) a clpiLd Illurder nl~l', the pwscculor presented testimony from the kq
l')lc\Villll'~" \vh,) gavl' al1l'xtrcmeiy ,!t:t.lilcd accounl of the killing. However, ill a statemenl
the Willll'~S gave 10 the police \horlly afLl'l' thl' killing, thl' witness gave a vastly differel11
illU'lIllt of Llw crilile (which the f1rn~<.:(uli()n nC'vc! disclosed to the defense), stating h(
Jid not SC ' lb -' a tuaJ kil Lin g, nor did he rC lll ember many of the details that he testifiec
to at trial, Th e Sup re me C Llrl re ve rsed the conviction based on the prosecutor'~
nnndi sclo ..,IIlT, but implied that Lh c witness's account had been "adjusted" by the proseclltol
I;Jr the trial, ;uld thatthc l.lrnsccutor had "coached" the witness's new story. Other instance~
of eyewitness memory adjustments by prosecutors reasonably lend themselves to procurin§
wrongful convictions.
Child witnesses. The testimony of child witnesses is especially vulnerable te
manipulation by prosecutors. A familiar instan ce i. the testimony of'yolln g childrl'n in
sexual abuse cases. Indeed, numerous insta'llces (lrWrongrul ( ol1vic!iom ar at trihlltaul t
t·o the It:~ tiln () n)' o f l'1il d witn essc~ (Garrell, 20 11 '), Co urts have incrcasin gly cC rtllinizcd
the testimony or ynUIl' childrell fo r coercive or suggestive co ndu ci by inlervi ewers in
preparing these witne SlCS for trial. l~o r example, ill Idaho II. ·Wright ( 1990), the, upremc
,o urt fund tlwt a chi.ld 's accw;a tion or sexual abuse was based 00 leading and suggestive
qm:sti ll n ing by an in rc rroga tor who had a preconceived idea of what the child should
be disclosing.
Prosecutors in seeking a conviction may present the testimony of children without
sufficient scrutiny of the truth of their stories and the techniques used to elicit their
testimony. Prosecutors have often failed to c.lrefuliy I.) robe tht: accuracy of the accounts
of child witnesses, and have not been su ffic iently ,lttcn tive to f,l cto r!> that m ight shed
li ght llU the trLlthflllnc~s of the cbild'~ acco unt, slich as th e absence o f spontanellUs
rccl lI, til e bias of tJ'I e interviewer, tbe lISC of leading questions, multiple interviews,
in ct:ssa nt questiolling, vilificati()n of the defendant, ongoing contact with p Ct' rs anol
references to th eir .. tatcments, and th e use of Ihreats, bribes, ;1I1c1 Clj olin g. Courts h~ vc
also criti ci!.cd the pros 'cLltor's failure to videotape or otherwise record the initial interview
session.
Cooperating witnesses. Cooperating witnesses are prouably th e most dangernus
prosecution witness of all. No other wiluess has such an extraordillar)' incentive to lie,
No other witness has the capacity to Illaoipulate, mislead, and deceive law enforcement
officials. No other witness is capable of lying 1.0 l'QlwinciJlgl,y and yd he believed by the
jury. \A/rongfld cOllvictions are replete with illstances i.n which cooperalillg \-vit!1csses gal'>:
blsc testimull), tlMt was crilicallo the verdi.cls (Carlcll, 2011).
A prmeclltor has <I powerful incentive to ~l'ek Ollt and accept a coOl'erall.lr'~ aCCLJlI II I.
ullcntically. Moreover, as Iloted ,lbovc, a prosecutor often bas a predetermined view or
Ihe fad'S of a Case tlwt may inhibit Lile proseclltor from scrutinizing the cooperator's nccOUil:
objectively. If a prosecutor has a theory of the case that has been dev >lopecl i'rnlil othL:1
evidence, or from the opinions of the investigators, the Pro~cLutor is more apt III ac[e!·~t
the ,;onperMor's vlT~ioll uncriticClLiy. If Lilc cooperato r d ·'viatcs (rom th~ pros 'cntor\ Iheol ).'
till.: 1)i1.)~l·(lIlor may (lIll Ilide th;]t the C )o perator is lyin " 0 1' withholding infuri1latl u.II, .,(
(:ooperal )1', ;11'" Illanipulalivc pe ople, a nd thc:.i r testi mony may in piliI' ill<' illtcgrltr:l
the CK t- fi nci ing 11roces to su ch " deg ree Ihat inn ocent pl'I' O il !; arc caughl. ill tilt' \\'C tlill!~
the oopc rator', li es. $ Olll <; PI' , e u to rs have i:l minJsettil,ll se rving jllstice 111(: ;11 1'; I'U~<)I]l:'
p ·'or! in jail and may tend to r -Iy heavily (In the cooper,l tor 's ac O Ulll. Moreover'l ~o.
.
'lC 1 1C
prosecutors ilr~' e, dy maillpu lated by coopel l1 tors, ,)lId therefore du not exam ll
.11 or
' . ,; tel l ,
opcraLOr'f, <.1 CO illll objc·· tively. If ;) p ro~ec Lll(lr negl ecl to probe a coopcral nl ,5 .
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. Ilcllsivel y probe thl' cooperatur s story inVites false testImony. oopcrators often come
~ 11'1 enviro n ments uf crim e and deceit that may make an I.Illllas tauding 01- truLll
r ~iguoliS. Cooperators Ina), not have a prosecutor's concern with exact facts, and may
~I:e langunge in a loose and I~()o-\jteral fashion that encourages them to make exaggerated
,.;scrtiO ns that they may believe ,Ire the truth.
; . Scientific aNd forellSic experts. Prosecutors' use. and misuse. of scientific evidence has
lJecn one of lh princ.ipal causes of wrongful convicLilJns, particularly in death penalty
.:d5es (Garrett, 2011). Proseclltor!> may present ·- through Ihe testimony of an expert
\vit.JIes.~ whom the proseclltor claims to be trustworthY-i1n opinjon linking the defendant
til the nime, when in fact the proof may be erroneous t1l' rraudulent. Pro ecutors ill
many cases have concealed from the defense evidence that would have discredited the
<,xpert's opinion, and distorted ljle evidence to make il appear reliable, orten with tragic
resulrs. Pros\,:cUl'ors have elicited fraudulent lestimony, erroneous ilnd prejudicial
cOJlclusions without any tactual basis, and opinions that ~1ppear to b~' LlCIseu on a valid
scientific theory hut are really the eXj)ert's speculation alld conjecture. Tbey also bave
attempted to bolster the expert's credibility by exaggerating Lile expeds b<lckground and
l'xpcrieJJce, and by givUlg the jury person.ll assurances that tbe expert is n~:dible and
reliable.
Prosecutors know that juries ordinarily view experts with heightened respect, J\1d give
considerable weight to their opi.nions. In contr~1st with other rypes of witnesses, the expcrl
is usually viewed by the jury with all aura of speci,ll reliahiUty <lnd lrustw()rlhine:,~.
Moreover, the expert usually posse ses impressive crc(knliuls that reinforce Ihe jury's trusl
in Ihe expert's upiniol1. Furtber, the expert is usually Cllil:l't al presenLing hi.-; or her
t~~ti111ony skiUfuUy aDd persuasively, and in Jangurlgc UHiI illJ'()r,~ C<if1 undnst<llld. [7inall)"
Ihe t'xpcr[\ conclusions almost always interlock with oLher evidl'n ce ill the C3se and
reinforce and cllrroborate the pro ecutjon's theory lli' guilt. More than any other witness,
the expert probably has the gre,ltest capacity to mislead the jury. And in tandem with a
prosecutor who aggressively seeks a conviction. tile experl «'ill provide the testimony that
virtually secures that conviction.
Fraudulent and erroneous sciel1tifi~' evidl'nce h,,~ ill(\uJ{'d JillWTpril1t~ plarJl('d at tile
scene of the crime, faked autopsies in death pcnairy cases, r: Iricalecl breathalyzcr readings
in intoxicated driving cases, and perjured testimony hy l"\perts making hair and blo J
comparisons. Prosecutors b,IVe also presenled as lrustworthy the tcst imony of scienlific
experts that contained false, exaggerated, and erroneous conciu::.inns t hat lacked a scknti.J1c
basis. Numerous instances of so-called "junk science" have been presented by prosecutors
as reliable and used to win cOllvictions. Some of these pseudo-experts are notorious for
promoting bogus opinions.
Moreover. because of the secretive nature of pre-trinl prep<l ration, the £11.111111':1' in which
a prosecutor is able to sh'lpc, m:mipul,It.:, ,lnt! even manu f;lctlirc the e. pl.!rt 's testill10ny
is virtually impossible lo provc. h is intuitively obvious, huwcvl'r, that the re lati()l1 ~ hip
between prosecutors alld [Iwir expcrt~, i~ Illlltlw ily rein fo rcin g of"L<:lI \lot in I.h t: :.c-r vil. ur
truth but to win a conviction . M<1J1Y experts displa y J pro- pro t: lI1iOIl bias, l'spe ·i:1 11
those employed by law enror 'ment ag(:llci('~ ( ,innlH:lli, 1 ~9 7) . Many of Ihc5 ex!-'crt
are notorious for manUl,lLtlll'illg t · ~ tillll>ll}" to fit the rroseclltion's theory ) f guilt. fj the
same token. prosecutors routinel y seck \,lUl t.:x!-'erl , who will support the prosecution's
theory of guilt, and reject t:J\ rt.:r!~. who lIIighl di) I,lar Ilwre independence (Faigman, et
a!., 2002) .
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Manipulating the Jury's Decision-Making
A PnlsL"cul.m has J spccial Ju fy not to mislead the r,lll-filldcrl)r atll'lllfti III 111, 111 ipul ::l It'
a jury's lIllilily In review the tvidcncc fairly and di~,p;b~i,)J1,lll'ly. T II\' ollPllll lll1il y ror a
pro ~ ccutor 10 Illi,l 'fi t! th ' Inct-finde.r <lnd manipulate the wrdi t inh eres ill virl u;11I 'tV T )'
ph'lSl' of the "rin)i11all fi., l. Misleading cO llduct can even rise to th e level of a dill' pro es,
vi o lati oll whcn it illvolve:; the knowing U$L' of false evidence, or when the prosecutor's
( nJHluc t rcnders the tri al hll1dalllellt,liJy untilir. The risk that an innocent pCl"son lDay be
convicted because of such tacli 's iIS evidenl.
False, misleading, and inflammatory tactics. Th.t· 1-'/"I)~\~Clltllr '~ delih!'r HI' lI'.( of'I'c)"ju)"cl!
testimony violates due process, Illay reslIlt ill an unfair trial, and may ev..~11 re.sult in Ihe
conviction of .Ill inllocent perSt1l1. [v('n non-deliberak COlltil.l C: t. Lh,ll clicit, j1<.'rjurct/
testimony is a due process violation if lhe prosecutor shOl~d have known about thl" perjury.
A proscculor also commits misconduct when she uses fraudulenl physic !1 evicience O[
creates false impressions frum the evidence, such as asking qucst ion, wilhout ~ factuill
basis, or insinuating that the defe ndant has a criminal background and a propensity to
l:OII111UI crimes.
A prosecutor also undermines the integrity of the trial and risks convicting an innocent
per~o n by refUTing to matters outside the record and misrepresenting the record. Thus,
cllmb have I"l!huked prO$Ixutors and in some cases reversed convictions for allusions to
private conversations with witnesses or the defendant; references to evidence that had been
excluded; insinuations that issues of fact have previously been authoritatively determined;
or comments that dilute reasonilble doubt and the presumption of innocence.
Prosecutors can also misreplesent the record by making false or exaggerated claims
that can mislead the jUl"y into convicting. In the well-known case of Miller v. Pate (1967),
a prosecutor committed reversible misconduct by misrepresenting in a rape and murder
trial that undershorts belonging to the defendant were stained with the young victim's
blood, when the prosecutor well knew that the stains were paint. Prosecutors have also
made false assertions that an object in the defendant's possession was the murder weapon,
that the defendant's fingerprints were found at the crime scene, and that the defendant
failed an intoxication test.
In addition, appeals by prosecutors to a jury's fears, passion., and prejudices arc.l
common tactic to manipulate the fact-finder and may produce all enoncelUS vcr<Ji Lt~ Such
conduct often appears deliberately calculated to impair a dcrend~lI1t's I iglll to a filLr trial.
For example, prosecutors have introduced inflammatory physi(,; 1eviden ce, have e./icitcd
inflammatory testimony contaiuing irrelevant racial ,md sexual innuendos, ,lnJ have
engaged in other inOanlln;ltory conduct designed to prejudi ce the jury.
Prosecutors are forbidden L(1 use arguments calculated to infh1l11l: t he pa s si()J1~ ;llld
prejudice of the jury. However, they also know that such argum ents are much more
effective than restrained and objective remarks, and some may be willi ng l(1 ;lSsulllC Ihe
risk that an appellate court will find the conduct not severe en ougb to warr,ult a reV r~;l~
when the remarks are viewed in black and white in the appeLlate record. Thus, proscclit r.>
ts
usc a litany Ilr <.; ulurFul and ahusive rh"tnric tn denigrate th ' dc(elld:l lll. ami s me ( Our
give the prOst~culnr collsirJ..:rab k latitlldt' in sllch c1iSIJ.Jf3gin g c.omm C/lt~. Pro~eculOr al '~
make argullll"llb calculated to incit, dl11 0 n g j uror::. feelin gs or Ie, r, :I nge l", :lII d rcvcJlg~I '
· rS (1
Exhortations to join the War on Crim e. predictio lls oj" Ihl" di re Lo nse'l li ence5 ir)11J"lJ· t'
" ;I)1
Cl
not convict, and exploitation. or the j ury's sYIllj1ath (()r the vi cti m to Ill cil' fce I'I Jl~~
anger and retaliation can sufficiently inflame a jury to r sull in th e nllvi lIO Il 0
innocent person.
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, krcJ, thre:1 tencd, and bnhcd pOlentlal WI tJ1C. SC;; , Appeals It) ~l Jury s [.>rcJL1dll't~ ~ nd
IlltJI~O;YI·~e.; ;1I~(1 may llndcrmjllL! lhl' aCCULILY of a verdi ct. such as app('als La rac.i;il,
,1l'1'
,
" I)1:1
' I l
I
'
, laJ religlOlls,
qelH [cr, Wt\1 I tII, :lrltI ratnol.ic
. CS , .-l'OScc.utors an a ISIJ ill,1 I(C otlcr
na lll )) ,
. "U1Tl cnts Ihal can [l1Is1c<1d a Jury IIlto O)JlVIL'tlllg ~L.lch, : Onllllcnts un <I dclclIcianl s
'~IITure 10 rcst'i/y. call witnesses, and engage in other c nstitulionally protecled d<:: tivity.
;;~n311Y, i:I proseculOJCan mislead the jury whell ~he Illakt:s fI pcr 'o nal cndors<:ment of the
,:rl'ng th ( f Ihe case, the credibility of witnesses, and the defendant's guilt.
s u~t"a.ir attacks on defendant's chara(:tcr. Prosecutors in mOllY of the GI,SCS in which
innocent persons wCre wrongfully convicted soughl to prejudice the jury' a 'sessment of
fhe evidence hy <1 tfacking tbe dctendant:~ cilarJCler. This tactic uSllal.lyworks, Tbe prejudio<ll
imp,ICI of a defendant's criminal or :>ordid ba.:kgrounJ on a jury can be devastating.
Studies show Ilwt when a defendant's criminal record is known and the prosecution' case
is weak, the chances of acquillal Me far less !ikely (I--:.uVCll & b:isel, 1%6), Prosecutors
arC well aware of the prejudicial effect on jurors, and even though courts attempt to
con flue such evidence to a proper purpose, prosecutors often find ways to expose a
defendant's bad character to the jury.
For eXJmpk, prosecutors in cross-examining a defendant might use a defendant's
criminal rcc(lrd not for [he propl!l' purpose of showing untruthfuln ess but to insinuate
guilt hy suggesting a predisposilil)ll 10 c(~mmit aime-', Prosecutors violate rules regulating
cross-examination by inclucijng inflammatory delails in Iheir questjons, especially when
the prior cri111es arc for violent ad s, or by portr:1ying rhe de fen dant as a dangerous,
sinjstcr, or undesirable person, How("vcr, i!' a defcml,l11t docs not take the witness sland,
a prosecutor is forbidden to introduce evidence of the defe ndant's criminal record.
Prosecutors use a variety of tactics to circumvent Ihis prohibi":ion by iJ1tro,luc:ing evidence
that the defendant used aliases, was pictured in 1)()li e "mug shots;' had po]jc crimiual
identification numbers signifying a prior arrc:;l, am:l lhrough other ways lilat depict tbe
defendant as a sinister char~lcter. Proseculors dls~ try tl) prove a defend, nt's guilt by
showing that the defendant may have ;1S. ciatcd with other cl' ,minals and courts sometimes
have reversed convictions because or lhis lildic.
Unfair attempts to bolster credibility. A pru~cclltor Gin mi·;!tJd 0 jury into giving a
witness's testimony greater believability uy JJ'rific ially inllating till' nt'Jihility of that
witness before it has been atlatked, This technique is referred to ,IS holslering, and its
lise may obstruct a juror's nllionaJ analysis of the blot;, ,uHlthc witne '. clTlJjbility, and
potentially resuJt in an erroneQUS \" rd.ict. Prmcclltur~ dl) not know whether a witness
is giving truthful testimony, yt:l they nlig.lil either l'xprl's~ly or impliedly assure jurors
thaI a witness is telling th e I ruth, The pers,lO:J1 endorseme nl of a witness's credibility by
a prosecutor is improper, nr.st, beci1ll.~e of the cx;1itcd posltioll a ,p rosecutor occupies in
th e eyes of the jury and the weight a juror Illa}' giVl' to rill: pwseClllnr\ assurances, and
second, becau se it may create the impr ~ s ion thai the l'rus(;clItor possesses other
information outside the record of the trial that supports l!he aS~l'rtiuli that the witness
is telling the truth,
Prosecutors also subvert thi s <l llli-ilo,lc!!tCI'il1 )5 rule by eliciting testimony frolll wilrH,:,,> ses,
particularly expert's, to endor~L' or v,t1id,lll' the credibility of other witn e.:; ~e. , wh ) m:1
be victims or eyewitnesses , The danger, \) LO llr'7c, is th:1t jurors often rely heavily on Ille
testimony of experts, Thus, if an expert offers an opinion that valicl~llc:~ .J I\·it LI es '.
truthfulness, or implicitly endorses the witness's truthfulness Ily ~ lIgges ljng Ihal tilL' wi tntss
is a member of a class of persons who are trustworthy, or 'ls~ertilJg li rec tly that thl' C01l\plainant ha s in filct been victimized, the jury may give that witnl' ~s':, lcs tilllllllY "ddl'd
weight. Appellate courts monitor this practice, anel convictions in child sexu:11 abuse,
pro~
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domestic violence, rape, and drug prosecutions have been reversed because of improper
l( 'SLilliollial int rft: rell hy cXI,crh.
Prose u!(lr~ L'Il1pl(l)' m ll er tact ics 10 l'llh,tll Ce a witn es \ n cdibilily. Pro: ecutors have
,lltelllptcd to bolotcr the credibilit y of" p(l'l iu: on, crs by luilltin g to rlw'lrd~ for heroism;
rclcrrillg !n w i tnl'_~~C'$ sLlccessfull }, pa, ing d polygr,II,lI lCSl; clicilill ' te, tjlllllllY 1",lt an informant
h,, ~ ,dwCl , hC'c n lruth ful; sugge.~ ti.Jlg Ihat ;1 co()I'CraLioll i1 'rCCITlCnl with ,I wil rle::.s was prepared
onl y ;lfter the prosecutor believed the wit ness; giving th ' jury t he misleading impression that
the 1 1 r(l ~ecu lor i~ il1ollit(lring the coopera tin g witn es~ to make sLire he tells the truth; deliberately
illtn lei uci Ill; inatl.rll is. iblc and prcjud iei:ll hC<1J ~a y to !iLlPpOrl a wi tne."s' testimony; manipulating
:-I wit Ilcss's invQcal ion o/" a privilege; instr llctillg a prosecution witn ' :iS to testify while holding
a Bihle; and having a child wiLnes$ sit 011 tilL' pro ecutor's la p while testifying.

Moving Forward
As we have seen, prosecutors by overt misconduct or the failure to scrutinize with
sufficient care tbe quality of their evidence and the reliability of their witnesses do in fact
contribute to the conviction of innocent persons. Assuming, quite properly, that prosecutors
seek to avoid such miscarri"g('~
jllstice, what ac"lion,," (an prosecutors take to prevent
the conviction of an innocent pl'r~on~ TI1l're a1 ..' ~l'VC:1 ,II ways that prosecutors' offices can
reduce the risk that an innocent I'erson will be LllllviCleel.
First, prosecutors' offices sit, ukl irnplclll III ongo ing education and training programs
that identi~r the best praCli e~ to insur' against wrongful co nvictions. Such programs should
emphasize the best practi es for interviewing, aSSe sing, and presenting in COLirt the testimony
of the kinds of witlll:SScS who have been most respo nsiblc for erronfO Ll~ (J1IlVictions-q','witnesses, children, cooperalor.~, ,HId expens, This I' raining might l(l(U5 Ull i%ues suell, ;l S
problcm~ or misidentifica tion, bow to deal with inco nsistL'nl and cOIltradictory slatement,
how to evaluate alternative per petrator evidencc, Itow to deal with 1.I11Ch'l rged crimindl
conduct, how to deal with drug, al o hol, or medical issl.ll~s Lhat might interfere with a
witness's accurate accounting, and any jlias or intcrQ;t til I lui:' witness may have.
Education and training should ell1pha:.i7.c colllplianct.: wit h J~rrldy I'. A411ryllilld (I %J)
and Ciglio I', United Stllt('~ r]972), including the lise of d lecklist s to review Ilhe various
typcs or ('vidcn ce that need 10 be do~cly scrlltinized for possihle- exculpaLury anel
impeachment infurmatio n, :;Udl as prior inconsistent- statements, cooperarjon (l!C'Teemcnt" ,
cri.l1lillal backgruwld evidence, ,lilt! ('vidence bearing on <l witness's motive to lie, l'ro..;ccutprs'
offices should also be trained o n working with police lepartmen s and individual police
officers who might be in possession of info rmation titaL \l) n), need to be eli closed to U1C
defense. Some police officer might Dot hL' aware or their con. titLlti~)\lal oblig,ltions u.ndl:r
Brady-Giglio, and pruwclllnr~ slwuld he traiJlt.:d tp assist the f10li e in understanding til,'lr
constitutional obligations arrd ca rrying OUI 1Il'ir Juties properly and ('frectiv.:!,y.
i
Second, prosecntors' offi ces should adopt I)oli les to enhance thL' rcli.l\)ility ur the fill '
e.
d'
0
I
I'
IdL
,
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"
-I
"
I'··
'yS}
lstt'
1
l1
un IIlg process. ne suc '1 po ICY wuu )C tn l1l,wllalJl an open II; L' l. J, dJvel ·
.,
whereby the entire file of a case is rout inely maJ e "vailahl to the defense wf ll i n adva~ll ~
of trial. Under such an open- fi le ''1'proa r h, Inatcri;d" lh al , re "("ili ""H I 1"0 c1crellsc dl'Ct~V~r);.
in -lu diJlg a li~l l( l I"ll S :cution witnesses, statements of lh (;~c wiLn esses, slim mll l"l~S (lc
.
.
1 " kl~l1)
slalem ·nts Illad e by WIlIt('$Ses, and rl'ievtl lltl'oll c repo rts, ore turned VCI" to LII c. Ih e
early ill th ~ ease. Moreovcr, an 01)('11 fil l.; poli cy th "L d iscl ose. every rel evan l itelll Iii i\l!~
p roseLL1ti~ln'. a e li) lbe defense may o(Lel" a belle r cbance o f lh prosec utor co rn p')~ _I;,
with his 13mdy -C;igli o disclosure obligation than a more restri ctive disCtJVcry 'If) prc.
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I 'cd, by using .In open file Lii ' overy system, a pro~ ec lltol would not have to assume
Illl""k (If making <I m istake in eva luating the llIateri;ILit), certain evidence. Under an
Iht:' :I'~iiL' poli 'y, lhc evidence would be Li i, 'losec1 rcga rJl e:;s Ill' materiality, Additionally,
oP( I'C.I1 tile sy,lelll would prote I the illtcgrily of th ' f, roe ' S$ in th e event a new prosecutor
,HI
" I 'Itll' Wit
'hl
' lCJlc:e ellters tI1C CIS' atll':I nec J s to ma k e a re 1'1
, 110D .J1lJy be llnlanll
t 1e eVlt
atIve y
;uick decision on whether to take a pica, go to trial, or seek ,I dismissal. Finally, an open
~Ie discovCfY policy would _enhance a prosecutor':; rcputation for transparency and fairness,
,InJ fl)ster in judges ;md delense lawyers a sense nf trusl lind reduce occasions for contentious
discuvery litigatinn.
Third, proseculors' officcs should also crcate dalabases for identifying and tracking
Hrad)' and Giglio int(.)rmation relating to key witlll'SSl:> ~lI(h as informants, police, and
exr erts who may have testified for the govemmenl in the pelst and may testify in future
CHses. For example, if .I prosecutor intellds tu call a$ :J witness a I oLice officer, Lhl~ prnseLlltor
could enter his name in the dat.1base, locate previuus cas ." ill which he lllay have testilJed,
or previous i.nvestigations in which he may haw been involved, to sec if he has been cited
for false or erroneous testimony, or ot.her qL1estiDn;]ble conduct. The same.:: type of vetting
(<Juld be done with informallts, e:qwrl witnessL'~, ;lud virtuaily allY otba witness, illcluding
even eyewitnesses, Indecl, slllllc'yewitnesscs have te,tined in several Jit'ferent and
unrelated prosccut'ions, raising :;erious questions ,1100111 thl'ir reliability.
Fourth, pro ecutur J offices should staL)lish progr,llll~ to investigate post-conviction
Jaims of actual innocl:l1ce. Indeed, ~ e Vl'ral pr cCLltnrs' Ilffi rers have created "Conviction
Integrity Units" or "Second -Look" bureaus to inve · tig~lte $uch daims nf actu;,tI inn ocence
in doseJ cases. The creation of these bureall s is consistent with a prosecutor's ethical duty
to "do justice." Pro(edml'~ ,-(lllid be "slablishcd l ,I sses ~ 1.Iaillls critically based on the kinds
of allegations made, For inslancc, claims with :;tlollg inJicia of ;I clual innocen cc might
be given illvc$tigHtivc priority, \l1(;h ;1\ claims of rnisid,'ntillcatioll, perjur)' by iuLonnallls
and cooperator., witne.~s rCTantatinn,-;, and allegatiol1s () newl y d iscovered ·' vidence. The
stl1udarJ 1(1\' reviewin g Llaims uf Jctll;d in l10 cncc sit )uld lIo l be unduly restrictive, but
should allow for flexibility in deciding which case to invcstigale, e.';l'ecially where a cbilll
is made Ihal is plausible and (OlItaillS specil)c facLual alkgaliurls tbal GH1 be investigated,
f illally, 10 redn ce I he ris k (If' wrongful convictions pr eClltors ::hould cslu bli. h pr t ) (J~
with pnlice d ' P,IrtmellI III beco me involved in Ih· investicralion earlier to :lssist police ill
protecting lhe in tegrity 01 the illV('.\tjgalinn from mistake ', 'l'cciaUy constitutitlllaimisiak ..
l)rosecut or should work with ]lolic,' departm ent s to establish trainin g an d edu ca tion
programs in the areas that an: Illost often iled as Glll SC' for wrongful onvi Cli uns - false:
confessions, use of informanls, and Bn.lcly and C,'iglio disclosure vi oJation~. lndecd, sin ce
Brady violations occur when policc t~lil tn lis 10:;(' exclIlpator)' in fnrmalioll to prosecutors,
il is imporlant for prosecLitl rs 10 cducalc poli -e () Il the nalure of nrmf,V informatio11 and
lhe irnpOrlanc ' d is losin g stich inlorlllatiol1, r'rnscclitors Cl)lLhl ,d~() .;dUC8k pllli~l' 011
hest pracl"ices fo r vi'Jeotaping COlli -iull', ;l1ld usi.lI g id entificalion procedurcs to 1"'l"Okcl
.Igain,sl mi sici cl1tili c;llion, ~lI ( h , s duuhl - blind lin 'ups, whcrc the (lfiic(' r (','nJl1C1ing till'
,1!iIlClIP du e~ Ilot know th e iclelllit)! Of lh ·' Lisped, ~IIIJ :;t: [llentiallinel1ps, in which persons
3re presented to Ill' wjlll ' ~~ nnc ;11;1 lim e rather Ihan all <.It once,

or

or

Conclusion
Prosecutors have a cOllstitutiol1<ll and ethical obligation to ensure that innocent people
do not get punished. A prosecutor is a minister of justice with virtwlily unlimited discretion
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wilh a crillll'. and a 1\'lIcalc ft r thai f\er.~on's conviction , nd punishmcnt.
Ihe lllllnhc.r 0 1 'xo ner:lIed d 'fcnda nts conlinl1c~ to 'mw, however, it bccol11' il1 crc,lsill bl),
ck ~r Ihal pro ~ec ul or . eilh t:1 b I ;]flirlll<lLivc aC1s of lllisco ndu -l, or il faillu'c 10 carefully
and rcspnn ihl)' . crul inize Ill ' qU:Jlit), or till' C idcnce, ~Ol11 e tillle do 'o ntrihUiC 10
d"fcmbllt 'wnlll:.'rul cn llviclilln~.
Hnw 'vcr, reining in prn.seculorial 'xc 's~ es lital f'rodu c(' wrollgful cOl1vi ti on, i a
di(fi -LIlt 1ask. ProSt'CllIOl'. rypicllily believe that lei"cndants ;.Jn~ guilty, and ~Igg ress i vc l )'
~cl'k to convi ncejuric to relurn 'uilty vcrdit:l.-;. Most prosecutors would probahl }1 clai.m
lhal the}' ll e V'r cOllv icted al1 innocenl pers n. l3ul sU'h a cla im i no t surprisin O'. S1uc.i.it:
show th<lt <l prnsecutclr's pnson:dily and mjnci sel may lead him or her to ciiscount 'vidence
slI pporLing the derendant's innocell ce as erroneOllS or unreliabk. This allitudc of denial
"imply rein(or( c~ the possibility Lhat a prose nor may pLlJ'~lle a conviction again st an
innoccnt person t'V('1l though sub~ lalltial evido..:n 'c poinls awa~' from guil!. Ulllcs~ l-'rosccutors
be:Wl11C more scnsit ive to the perilous siLuaLion facing dcfenLi;:mt5 who arc actu,]Jly inn ent.
and to the: kinds of dangerou' willlcsses and cl lllbiguous t'viclenn' that have been [t:.~po ll.sihlr
for producing miscarriages of justice, and unless Ihey arc able to discipline Ihemse.lves tf)
be skeptical and open-minded regarding the sufficiency of the prouf, IhL' likelihood is
that many more innocent pe pic roulin ely wiU be convicted.
,(\~
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